This June the FBI arrested a group of Russian intelligence officers and agents. American commentators were puzzled at the spies’ lack of success in stealing “secrets.” Even though the KGB has enjoyed great success in covert influence operations against the culture of the United States throughout the last hundred years, most Americans are still largely blind to the 20th century’s “great game,” the war against America that communists won.
Federal prosecutors brought the Russian spies to court several days after their arrest. Vicky Pelaez, a Spanish-language writer for an American media service, was a pitiful sight. She appeared dazed and confused, a Hispanic housewife snatched from her kitchen.
Early American Flirtation with Active Measures
Partly in response to the communist revolution, Woodrow Wilson’s Progressive administration tried its hand at overt propaganda. In April, 1917, Wilson formed America’s first 20th century propaganda group–the Committee on Public Information (CPI). The CPI’s main objective was to bring the US into WWI, and to weaken German power. The CPI’s targets were both domestic and international. Among the international targets was Russia. Conflicting objectives created confusion, however. The Bolshevik threat to American business interests in Russia was of concern, but a strong communist Russia was also a powerful deterrent to German power. The CPI was disbanded after operating for two years. The effort left a bad taste in Washington’s mouth, but created some native expertise.
After Wilson’s short-lived stab at the influence game, it was only after World War II that America began to understand the rules of the game. When we belatedly tried to play, it was too late. The Russians had the upper hand. The KGB and its predecessors had infiltrated and begun the process of twisting to their benefit the most intimate domains of our culture.
Lenin Initiates Covert Influence Operations
Flush with success and certain of global communist domination, in 1921 Vladimir Lenin surveyed the situation. His army was all but imaginary. Worn down by WWI and the internal wars that followed, the Russian military was no match for any of its neighbors. Prosecuting a shooting war in Europe, Asia, or America was beyond the possible for the Red Army.
At the same time, Lenin was having second thoughts about Marxist dogma. The whole “dictatorship of the proletariat” theory looked ridiculous in the cold light of reality. He announced variations on communist theory, producing what became know as Marxism-Leninism. The key rationalization was that dictatorship by the masses was a goal, maybe a long-term goal. In the meantime, before reaching this paradise, Russia and humanity would go through a transition.
Lenin’s theory explained that during the early phases after establishing a communist state, an “Elite Vanguard” would control all decision-making, while preparing the masses for full communism. Russian elites, Lenin’s communist cronies, were the vanguard. With this justification of his dictatorship, Lenin provided a template for intellectuals to embrace his ideology. The need for an Elite made them special, and necessary, and gave them great power. At the same time they could claim to be wielding power “for the little people, the masses.”
ComIntern for Covert Influence
Faced with his lack of military strength, Lenin conceived a plan for global spread of communism using his party’s proven covert capabilities. He established the Communist International (ComIntern). This ostensibly independent group of communist leaders from around the globe was actually a front for Soviet political control. It also provided cover for international intelligence operations. After Stalin seized the reins of Soviet power, he strengthened the covert ops begun by Lenin, even as he ruthlessly murdered many of the operators. Though he did away with the ComIntern, its intelligence operations continued.
Covert Influence Methodology
The most long-lasting, virulent, and dangerous active measure is covert influence. In a covert influence operation a payload is secretly inserted into some part of the enemy’s communications channels. The ultimate goal of covert influence is to transform the enemy in a way that is useful to the attacker.
In a typical covert influence operation an intelligence officer targets an agent of influence. The target is chosen for access to a desired channel of communications (the ComIntern intel operators targeted American media, academia, and Hollywood). The intelligence officer uses standard recruiting tradecraft to become friends with the targeted agent of influence. Appealing to the identified vulnerabilities of the targeted agent, the officer burrows into the target’s life.
The targeted agent of influence may, or may not, know that she is dealing with a hostile intelligence service, even after she is recruited. The agent might provide her services because she believes in the message, or she may work for pay, or maybe for some other gratification. In the actual operation, the espionage officer provides the recruited agent of influence with the payload. The agent of influence inserts the payload into his communications channel. Once the payload is inserted, in the form of a news story, an editorial, a speech, a book, a lecture, a movie, a radio program, a song, a play, or any other form of communication, the payload takes on a life of its own.
The message can influence consumers for the rest of their lives. All it takes is one time exposure, and consumers’ beliefs and attitudes can be changed. Reading a book or an article, hearing a song or a radio show, seeing a movie or a play are potentially life-changing experiences. The communist covert influence message was intended to change individual and societal morals and values.
In the Russians’ Pelaez case, the intelligence officer’s development and recruitment of the targeted journalist included marriage. This is a level of commitment and dedication that very few free world intelligence services can demand or expect. A steamy combination of true belief in her message, infatuation with her recruiting officer, substantial lifestyle benefits (a free ride to New York City and US citizenship) seemed to motivate Pelaez. Her influence work at the Hispanic newspaper in New York is typical of covert influence payloads. She denigrated the US and its policies, at the same time she lauded Latin American dictators, with the payload masked as her “point of view.” It is likely that her influence work changed the attitudes and beliefs of hundreds or thousands of those exposed to her intel operations. (See parts 2 and 3 later.)
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