In the one area where bipartisan support was fairly robust, such as the Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, the recent defense budget requests of the new administration have outlined a plan for a four year lockdown of nuclear material, often described as making universal the original Nunn-Lugar legislation. The program helps secure, in part, nuclear weapons junk in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, to prevent its proliferation to, in large part, rogue states. The previous administration had secured pledges of $17 billion toward a $20 billion goal, to expand the program over the past decade. Some parts of this effort have been successfully completed. The program of megatons to megawatts has been particularly good. The current program, if implemented, could be a major step in counter proliferation efforts. But while securing nuclear material so it does not fall into the hands of terrorists, we should be at least equally concerned with nuclear material already in the hands of terror master states!
Remember, the severest critics of the Bush administrations counter proliferation policies were the strongest supporters of the admittedly weak counter proliferation efforts in the Clinton administration with respect to these rogue states. They were enthusiastic supporters of the North Korean 1994 deal, and were sharply critical of any and all who even hinted that the North Koreans were not keeping their part of the Agreed Framework bargain.
What has been described as the decade of neglect on arms control and counter proliferation was anything but! The previous administration successfully eliminated any chance the newly liberated Iraqi people will get back in the nuclear business. The Libyan government has come clean, giving up not only its nuclear weapons program, but its chemical and biological weapons program as well. The Khan network was shut-down as well. This extraordinary breakthrough was outlined in detail by DCI Tenet recently in both Congressional testimony and in his book detailing his tenure at CIA.
That is not to say we are out of the woods. Far from it. We still face many of the same problems. On Iran, elements within the IAEA keep trying to give the Mullahs a clean bill of health, and the Mullahs keep embarrassing the IAEA, as further and further details of yet another nuclear program in Iran surface. Whether the events in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq have the same impact on Iran, as they had on Libya’s Ghadaffi, remains to be seen. Unfortunately, if we fail to adequately secure Iraq’s future and allow undue Iranian influence in the country, we may give incentives to Iran to further cripple IAEA inspections through concealment and deception and as a result find ourselves with a nuclear armed Iran controlling Iraq much as it is now doing in Lebanon.
Recent cooperative efforts of the US, Great Britain and others on sanctions may have finally brought into sight an end to the Iranian program, or at least a roadmap that could lead to such an end. We will have to wait and see. The sanctions are better than they have ever been, but their use and enforcement remains highly uneven. Too many fail to take the Iranian threat seriously, most notably Russia and China, both involved in providing technology and investment to the very programs in Iran which we are seeking to get their cooperation to end! Switzerland can be added to that mix as well.
On North Korea, what are the lessons learned? Early critics were insistent the Bush administration compromise and sign a deal because of that country’s then current arsenal of 1-2 nuclear weapons, an estimate used by former defense secretary William Perry. When the administration insisted on the complete dismantlement and elimination of the entire North Korean nuclear program, these same critics immediately back-tracked, claiming a freeze was all in good order because no one really knew whether the North really had nuclear weapons or not.
When the Bush administration secured a unanimous agreement among the parties–other than North Korea–that a verified elimination of Pyongyang’s nuclear program was the only acceptable outcome–critics once again blamed the administration for the North’s refusal to even consider such a deal, even as the North insisted that while it didn’t have a secondary enrichment program, (which it twice admitted it had), it nonetheless had the right to keep one!
The Bush administration inherited a policy described by Rich Lowry of National Review as “trust but don’t verify” from the previous administration. One senior Clinton administration counter- proliferation official admitted in late 2000 that the incoming Bush administration should throw away the Clinton era counter proliferation plans, and start over.
Although the problems inherited in 2001 remain in part now a decade later, much has been cleaned up by a tough and energetic approach by the past administration, including the proliferation security initiative, a cooperative effort to interdict nuclear smuggling and trade. In addition, the US and British uncovered and hopefully eliminated for good an extensive rogue suppliers market for nuclear materials that was centered in Pakistan, the Khan “Nukes ‘R Us” outfit.
The effort to end nuclear weapons programs in nations legally committed never to build them but committed to securing them nonetheless requires more than negotiations in Geneva or Bonn or New York. Diplomacy, without the required enforcing military power begins to look a lot like prayer or wishful thinking. A whole host of tools, including missile defense, export controls, arms control, deterrence, dissuasion, interdiction, serious sanctions and yes, regime change, are all part of the diplomatic, military and political elements that would have to be used to make up an effective counter proliferation policy.
The Bush administration moved us in the right direction. The removal of wicked dictators in Afghanistan and Iraq played no small part in the success to date. These lessons are important as we look ahead to 2011 and continued attention to US security needs. A free Iraq guards against a nuclear Iran. A free Afghanistan eliminates an ally of the Pakistani Taliban and elements of the ISI who seek an Islamic Pakistan with an inventory of one hundred nuclear bombs.
The persistence of these proliferation challenges, however, is testimony to the wickedness of the rogue states and their terror accomplices we seek to stop, not to the failure of the United States to live up to its arms control commitments.
COMMENTS
Please let us know if you're having issues with commenting.