Now that new START has been ratified by the US Senate and is apparently close to ratification by the Russian government, it might be useful to ask “What is the Future of Nuclear Arms Control?” Most Americans would think that the two most urgent threats are nuclear weapons in the hands of the Pyongyang regime and the prospects for nuclear weapons to be in the hands of the Mullahs in Tehran. Not so fast!
The grand priests of arms control have other ideas. They seek an additional treaty with Russia. This would combine somewhat lower totals for deployed strategic nuclear warheads within a new aggregate total on all warheads. These would include those in our stockpile, (generally stored) and those warheads on weapons we term “tactical” or battlefield nuclear weapons. This is where Russia may have 5000-10,000 such weapons.
This would include both stockpiled warheads (where we have lots more than the Russians) and non-strategic warheads (where the Russians have lots more than we do). In any case, we are talking about some very serious verification issues.
What can we expect? Some fancy footwork or slight of hand may be required. What may be proposed is that we first accept a Russian “declaration” for their battlefield numbers. Just simply Moscow says: “This is what we have boys”. (Personally, I think a serious problem is the fact that we don’t know how many Russia has or where it stores them–that’s the transparency issue.)
Won’t happen or too absurd? Well, it has been argued recently that under the 2001 Moscow treaty on nuclear weapons reductions, the US and Russia both simply “declared” what deployed warheads we had with each system (Subs, bombers and ICBMs). So why not do the same with respect to battlefield nuclear weapons? Declare a certain number as deployed. (The Russians would, of course, insist the US declare where our European based warheads are deployed).
Why this direction? Well, there is very little trade-space between U.S. and Russian non-strategic warheads. Remember we have 1500 and they may have over 10,000. We’d want something for virtually nothing if the treaty just addressed non-strategic nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, while New START gave us leverage to trade lower levels of missiles, bombers and submarines which the Russians wanted in return for lower levels of Russian battlefield weapons, which we wanted, no such trade was concluded.
This debate is also further complicated by the unfortunate ignorance of many over for what use these weapons are deployed. A recent report from the Wall Street Journal claimed simply that tactical, generally small-scale nuclear weapons (but often the size of the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan in 1945), are for battlefield use only and strategic nuclear weapons–the big ones–are only for burning cities to the ground. This often inevitably leads analysts to believe the number of such weapons is immaterial. After all, as global zero enthusiasts argue, how many weapons do you need to blow up a city?
This is a serious error in analysis and in history. Since the late 1950’s and especially during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, US nuclear strategy claim to rely increasing on flexible response doctrines and a “counter-force capability”. The latter strategy calls for the US to hold at risk, (or target), the other guys weapons.
In any potential conflict, during a crisis, this capability would enable the US to limit the extent to which Russian weapons could remain in a sanctuary, from which Moscow could threaten their use with impunity.
However, at some point, instability could result if one side or the other had the ability in a surprise attack to eliminate the other guy’s weapons before they ever got off the ground. That is why for over half a century, the US has missiles in silos in the ground, some portion of our submarines at sea, and bombers able to be launched with sufficient notice. This Triad was very, very stable. And we invested heavily in making sure all systems worked, were sustained and were continuously modernized.
In order to avoid a sudden, pre-emptive surprise attack from the Russians, we kept a force sufficiently diverse, spread out and “on alert” to eliminate the potential temptation to “go first in a crisis”. In a December piece in the New York Times and in a paper published by the Brookings Institution some within the arms control community have questioned whether such a stabilizing force structure is even needed in the future. It appears survivability and stability are out; and vulnerability and temptation are in!
The reason for our concern is simple: you cannot go down to very low levels of deployed nuclear weapons unless you radically restructure your deployed forces of bombers, missiles and submarines. And this can push you into a force deployment that actually invites attack rather than deters it because it is too small to be survivable.
I think the conventional wisdom that expects to move in this “new” direction” is based more on wishful thinking than actual sound analysis. I also believe it comes from a pre-occupation with trying to “break” the US Triad of complimentary nuclear forces rather than any serious assessment that such future reductions actually make us better off. And breaking the Triad is considered a critical step toward rendering our nuclear deterrent relatively useless. Similarly, getting to a single-payer nationalized health insurance system in America starts with the first step of putting the health insurance people out of business.
However, according to the resolution of ratification of the new START treaty, the next round of “arms control” has to address non-strategic nuclear weapons or battlefield weapons before our strategic systems are further reduced.
This presents a problem to global zero advocates. We have nothing to offer Russia in return for reductions in their non-strategic nuclear weapons, except perhaps the withdrawal of our tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. If we do that–a long-wished for outcome Russian has long pursued–we decouple the US from NATO, destroy the extended nuclear deterrence we have maintained for nearly 30 of our allies for the past half-century, and end the most successful alliance in our history. Some arms control!
So what we are probably going to see laid on the table is a grand bargain type of package to keep the arms control process moving. Problem with this is that the U.S. arms control community is negotiating with the US side only. Russia has little interest in either further reductions in strategic warheads or any limits on non-strategic warheads. They would like to limit our “upload capability”–to expand in a crisis–but that would require that we accept either limits on our non-deployed stockpile of nuclear weapons, (nearly impossible to verify)or further reductions in submarine, missile and bomber launchers that once again calls into question the continued viability of the US strategic nuclear Triad.
It is this, of course, that is most worrisome. As I have mentioned, many in the disarmament community want to “break the Triad”. This would allow very dramatic further reductions in warheads and launchers once the need for a “triad” goes bye-bye. Would the US move in that direction? Maybe. While the new START ratification resolution requires the US to maintain a nuclear Triad into the future, it does not say whether the “Triad” must be robust or not. And there are advocates of a unitary or monad force–a submarine only force or a force without submarines but with only ICBMs.
Therefore a make a grand bargain involving overall nuclear warheads–deployed, non-deployed, strategic and tactical–may end the US triad and seriously mess with strategic stability. This analysis argues that we not venture down that road, no matter how often the drive-by media swoon over such prospects.
On the other hand, an alternative may emerge. In any bargain, Russia will demand big concessions. And Russia will have its supporters pushing such a deal. And such a deal absent breaking the Triad will entail curtailing missile defenses BIG TIME. (The Duma may move in the direction of calling for such curbs on missile defense even under the provisions of the new START treaty). In short, if we throw everything we want into the mix, the Russians get to add on, too.
So, I think a grand bargain treaty is a nonstarter from the perspective of our security needs. But that is not what motivates folks, especially the Global Zero dreamers. This mad hatter tea party world of “no nuclear weapons” has, tragically and unfortunately, become the platform upon which some usually very serious thinkers have taken a stand.
The reasons are convoluted but need examination. The theory goes like this: the US has to demonstrate we are serious about going to zero; this in turn is the only way to get the world media “on our side”; and in turn that is the only means of securing the assistance of key countries such as Russia, China, Brazil, Turkey to “really, really” take counter nuclear proliferation seriously.
This of course means Iran and North Korea. And that in turn means some kind of “deal” must be reached with Iran, even if short of Iran’s full elimination of its bomb making capability. Such a deal keeps “Global Zero” afloat. It thus stops Israel and the American “neo-con” hardliners from seeking regime change in Iran. “Contain” Iran replaces “Stop” Iran.
This changes the nature of the discussion in the 2012 debate. Pushing regime change in Iran is taken off the table. Containment, like détente and peaceful coexistence before it, becomes the new watchword. A nuclear armed Iran becomes the new reality. The most evil of regimes with the most awesome of weapons.
It is true battlefield nuclear weapons in Russia could go “missing,” and securing these weapons should be a high priority. But secure weapons can still be given or sold to terrorist groups. My single biggest worry is that Iran creates a terror group solely for the purpose of using a weapon against the US–and that weapon is built by the Iranians themselves, or purchased from North Korea.
True, the Russians have too many of these battlefield weapons for any rational purpose. And they have lots more than we do, which may make some of our NATO allies nervous and makes our Pacific rim allies very nervous, (to the point where they are seriously thinking about building their own nuclear deterrent).
Russia and the US may start with a transparency agreement — exchanging data on numbers and locations. It may be total hooey, but the media will of course swoon and claim how historic such an agreement is, even if very informal. Being “historic” means it cannot be opposed. (Now you understand the role of the drive-by-media–they reinforce the “reigning progressive political template.”)
This doesn’t have to be a formal treaty. We will expand efforts to secure such weapons. We could share best practices on security; help Russia move them away from insecure locations to more centralized storage, etc. We provide the funding through CTR; they provide us with access, etc. If necessary, we offer some type of reciprocity at NATO sites. And we all hold hands and sing…..
In the end, should skeptics argue the Russian numbers are too large, supporters will argue that Russia points “lots of them” at China to the east (remember those nice folks in Peking). The argument will be “Their security environment is different from ours” – i.e., Georgia, Ukraine, the “near abroad.” We may be asked to ignore Russian scary statements about the early and often use of nuclear weapons and understand Moscow feels “surrounded.”
In short, the pursuit of more formal arms control will push into the future a serious pursuit of a nuclear free Korean peninsula and Persian Gulf. The real threat remains not the size of the US nuclear arsenal but Iranian mullahs and Korean strongmen in pursuit of hegemonic dreams and empire wishes.