Aug. 10 (UPI) — On June 24, two powerful earthquakes measuring magnitude 7.2 and 7.5 struck northern Venezuela. The toll was catastrophic: more than 6,000 people were reported dead, tens of thousands were injured and thousands remained missing.
Beyond the loss of life and the enormous economic damage, the disaster exposed a deeper problem. Its scale cannot be explained solely by geology. Human decisions also played a role.
Earthquakes are natural phenomena, but their consequences are shaped by society. The extent of the damage depends on the quality of construction and whether safety standards are enforced. It also depends on whether the state has the capacity to anticipate risk and respond effectively when disaster strikes.
When buildings collapse on a massive scale, investigators must look beyond the earthquake itself. Weak supervision, informal housing and poor urban planning can turn a natural hazard into a human catastrophe.
That raises a broader question for Latin America: How widespread are these vulnerabilities, and must another major disaster occur before governments act decisively?
Venezuela has had earthquake-resistant construction standards for decades. Technical institutions in the country have repeatedly addressed seismic risk and structural vulnerability. The central problem is not simply whether regulations exist. It is whether they are enforced.
Reports and technical assessments cited by Venezuelan institutions have pointed to recurring problems such as inadequate compliance with construction codes and weak supervision. International organizations, including the U.S. Geological Survey and U.N. agencies involved in disaster assessment, have also emphasized the importance of structural vulnerability in determining the human impact of earthquakes.
The lesson is straightforward: The force of an earthquake matters, but so does the strength of the society that confronts it.
In Venezuela, institutional weakness has become increasingly difficult to separate from the country’s broader political and economic deterioration.
Officials who fail to perform the duties entrusted to them weaken public institutions. When inspections are neglected or construction standards are ignored, the consequences may remain hidden for years. An earthquake can suddenly expose those failures.
Corruption makes the problem worse.
When permits are improperly granted or public contracts lack transparency, citizens are placed at risk. When substandard materials are accepted, corruption ceases to be an abstract political offense. It becomes embedded in the physical structures where people live and work.
Negligence must also be distinguished from corruption. Not every institutional failure involves theft or personal enrichment. Some result from incompetence, lack of resources or the gradual erosion of professional standards.
That distinction matters because accountability must rest on evidence.
Investigators should determine which agencies were responsible for inspections, what standards applied and whether warnings were ignored. They should also examine the role of private contractors and public officials.
Where corruption or deliberate disregard for safety can be demonstrated, sanctions should follow. Where failures resulted from weak institutions or inadequate technical capacity, reform is necessary.
Accountability should not become a substitute for evidence, nor should it become an instrument of political revenge. Its purpose must be to establish responsibility and prevent the same failures from recurring.
This is especially important in a country where public confidence has been severely weakened.
Venezuela has experienced years of institutional deterioration, patronage and political polarization. Those conditions create fertile ground for impunity. They also make it easier for administrative failures to become normalized.
The earthquake revealed the consequences of that normalization.
The response now should go beyond emergency relief.
An independent assessment of damaged and vulnerable structures should be carried out, with the findings made public. Schools and hospitals should receive immediate attention. Older residential buildings in high-risk areas should also be evaluated.
Construction permits and major reconstruction contracts should be subject to transparent review. Engineers and inspectors must be able to report violations without political interference.
Informal communities require special attention. Many families live in vulnerable areas because they have no realistic alternative. Strengthening those neighborhoods will require technical assistance and safer construction methods, rather than punishing residents.
International organizations can contribute expertise and independent evaluation. Their role should be practical and measurable. Venezuela needs help strengthening institutions and reducing future risks, not just expressions of concern after a disaster has occurred.
The responsibility for reform, however, ultimately belongs inside Venezuela. The country must determine where public officials failed and whether those failures involved corruption, negligence or institutional incapacity. Justice should follow where wrongdoing can be proven. Reform should follow wherever institutions have failed.
The lesson extends beyond Venezuela.
Across Latin America, rapid urban growth has often outpaced effective regulation. Informal housing has expanded while public institutions struggle to supervise construction and prepare for disasters.
Earthquakes cannot be prevented. The collapse of vulnerable structures, however, is not always inevitable.
The damage caused by a natural disaster reflects choices made long before the ground begins to move. Governments decide whether regulations will be enforced. Institutions decide whether warnings will be taken seriously.
Venezuela’s tragedy should therefore be understood as more than a seismic event. It is also a warning about what happens when institutional weakness becomes normal.
If that warning is ignored, the next earthquake may expose the same failures all over again.
Carlos Cantero is a Chilean academic at the International University of La Rioja in Spain and the author of “Digital Society: Reason and Emotion.” An international lecturer, adviser and consultant, he focuses on ethics, social innovation and human development. The views and opinions expressed in this commentary are solely those of the author.