So while the core issues of the conflict must be negotiated, the basis of those negotiations is clear: a viable Palestine, and a secure Israel. The United States believes that negotiations should result in two states, with permanent Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and permanent Israeli borders with Palestine. The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps, so that secure and recognized borders are established for both states. The Palestinian people must have the right to govern themselves, and reach their potential, in a sovereign and contiguous state.
Forgetting for a moment whether Obama was right or wrong for making that declaration, there is a serious problem with his statement...the pre-June 1967 borders do not exist!
Anti-Israel forces changed the meaning of 242 by adding one simple article to the resolution: “the.” They claim that 242 calls for Israel to withdraw from “the” territories taken during the Six-Day War. The resolution actually says that "Israel should withdraw from territories" taken during the war (no article). Adding the article changes the meaning from withdrawing from some
territories to all
It was no accident “the” was left out. Diplomats are very exact in their language. During the negotiations to create resolution 242, Arab governments tried three times to have “the” inserted in the resolution and their request was rejected. But, by repeating what they wanted the resolution to say all these years, the Arabs succeed in convincing many people to accept their distorted interpretation of 242.
Statements made by the drafters of 242 prove there is no ambiguity about what they meant.
Lord Caradon, sponsor of the draft that was about to be adopted, stated, before the vote in the Security Council on Resolution 242:
“… the draft Resolution is a balanced whole. To add to it or to detract from it would destroy the balance and also destroy the wide measure of agreement we have achieved together. It must be considered as a whole as it stands. I suggest that we have reached the stage when most, if not all, of us want the draft Resolution, the whole draft Resolution and nothing but the draft Resolution.” (S/PV 1382, p. 31, of 22.11.67)
Michael Stewart, (Great Britain) Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, in reply to a question in Parliament, 17 November 1969:
“Question: “What is the British interpretation of the wording of the 1967 Resolution? Does the Right Honourable Gentleman understand it to mean that the Israelis should withdraw from all territories taken in the late war?”
Mr. Stewart: “No, Sir. That is not the phrase used in the Resolution. The Resolution speaks of secure and recognized boundaries. These words must be read concurrently with the statement on withdrawal.”
George Brown, British Foreign Secretary in 1967, on January 19, 1970:
“I have been asked over and over again to clarify, modify or improve the wording, but I do not intend to do that. The phrasing of the Resolution was very carefully worked out, and it was a difficult and complicated exercise to get it accepted by the UN Security Council. “I formulated the Security Council Resolution. Before we submitted it to the Council, we showed it to Arab leaders. The proposal said ‘Israel will withdraw from territories that were occupied’, and not from ‘the’ territories, which means that Israel will not withdraw from all the territories.” (The Jerusalem Post, January 3 1970)
Arthur Goldberg, US representative, in the Security Council in the course of the discussions which preceded the adoption of Resolution 242:
“To seek withdrawal without secure and recognized boundaries … would be just as fruitless as to seek secure and recognized boundaries without withdrawal. Historically, there have never been secure or recognized boundaries in the area. Neither the armistice lines of 1949 nor the cease-fire lines of 1967 have answered that description… such boundaries have yet to be agreed upon. An agreement on that point is an absoute essential to a just and lasting peace just as withdrawal is… S/PV. 1377, p. 37, of 15. 11.67
Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State, 12 July 1970 (NBC “Meet the Press”):
“That Resolution did not say ‘withdrawal to the pre-June 5 lines’. The Resolution said that the parties must negotiate to achieve agreement on the so-called final secure and recognized borders. In other words, the question of the final borders is a matter of negotiations between the parties.”
Eugene V. Rostow, Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale University, who, in 1967, was US Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs:
“… Paragraph 1 (i) of the Resolution calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces ‘from territories occupied in the recent conflict’, and not ‘from the territories occupied in the recent conflict’. Repeated attempts to amend this sentence by inserting the word ‘the’ failed in the Security Council. It is, therefore, not legally possible to assert that the provision requires Israeli withdrawal from all the territories now occupied under the cease-fire resolutions to the Armistice Demarcation lines.” (American Journal of International Law, Volume 64, September 1970, p. 69)
Geraldo de Carvalho Silos, Brazilian UN representative, speaking in the Security Council after the adoption of Resolution 242:
“We keep constantly in mind that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has necessarily to be based on secure, permanent boundaries freely agreed upon and negotiated by the neighboring States.” (S/PV. 1382, p. 66,22.11.67 ).
When it comes to Israel, President Obama has a very short memory. Not only were there no 1967 borders, but there was never an intention for Israel to move back to the 1949 armistice lines. That's also why the president's call for Israel to stop building communities outside the 1949 armistice lines is so absurd. It is also why the UN is being disingenuous every time they call for Israel to retreat to the 1967 borders, since it was the UN who first declared that there were no such thing as 1967 borders.''
Cross-posted from NewsRealBlog