Obama: Less Competent than Jimmy Carter

It is not true that General McChrystal demonstrated insubordination (as too many commentators held), and if we remember the long train of events launched in the fall of 2008 and concluding in McChrystal’s dismissal, we will readily understand that.

First, this was not an act of insubordination. There was no refusal to follow orders, no evasion of orders, no failure to report, no countermanding of orders. It is a mistake to treat an act of conspicuous disrespect for an act of insubordination. While the discourse in the U. S. now tends to misread such disrespect as insubordination, that is both technically and colloquially incorrect. The current practice results rather from an attempt to insulate the President from any reflection upon his character and performance by appointed officials. While it may be appropriate for a commander-in-chief to relieve an officer who manifests such disrespect, it is not a legitimate occasion of reprimand. Say, rather, that General McChrystal has made a very important point about the formulation of policy in the current Administration, which has now raised the stakes for the President’s performance.

Nor does the disrespect demonstrate any political opposition to the President or even contempt for his inexperience. There is only one reason for the disrespect shown: incompetence. Remember, these are the people who are most directly affected by the feckless decision making of the President and those around him. They are in the best position to judge that decision making, and they have witnessed a ham-handed and destructive mode of proceeding that has served only to make their jobs considerably more difficult. Example: the artless handling of President Karzai of Afghanistan. Obama has shown himself to be even less competent than Jimmy Carter was, and that is a very large distinction.

Nor is this problem merely a repeat of the usual dynamics of presidential administrations. Whispers about the incompetence of the President are pervasive not only throughout U. S. government but also globally. The conflicting views of different secretariats in the government are a common story in the U. S. Remember Colin Powell as Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice as National Security Council Director, Vice President Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush. There are also rivalries for influence. The problem is a common one, and the measure of a President is his ability to control the problem. That remains to be demonstrated. The President has already announced that he sees no reason in this case to make any other changes in his team, although it is plain that the relations of the Ambassador to Afghanistan, the Special Envoy to Afghanistan, the Secretary of State, the National Security Director, the Vice President, and the military are the actual source of the frustrations vented by General McChrystal. If President Obama suffers greater “lack of respect” than his predecessors, it is perhaps because Obama has only been less attentive to the role he has played through indecisiveness in fostering this situation. Thus, the reason for disrespect is incompetence combined with an extreme reluctance to embrace a policy direction contrary to his campaign platform, which is the real source of his difficulties.

Accordingly, the “quick” dismissal (And what was so quick about it, given the technical means that would have permitted a “face-to-face” confrontation immediately and did not require a long flight from Afghanistan and several days before acting?) does not reinforce an image of a commander-in-chief in charge. Obama’s reaction demonstrated only that the impression made on him was dramatic. There was never a doubt who the commander-in-chief is. Whether he is in charge, though, depends entirely upon how he manages his policy team (badly) and how he goes about making and carrying out decisions (poorly). Obama has not risen in stature by doing something that was simply unavoidable in the circumstances.

Reviewing the overall fact picture supports this reading. Starting in August-September 2008, the commander in Afghanistan presented a proposal for a “surge” in Afghanistan. In late September of that year, President Bush decided that he could not make such a decision without obtaining the consent of the two candidates for president, one of whom was going to be elected in fewer than eight weeks. At that time, it seemed all but certain that Sen. Obama would be the one elected. Bush called in Obama and McCain, shared the intelligence and the proposal with him, and sought their commitment to carry it out. Sen. Obama declined. On that basis, President Bush deferred a decision to be made by the new President, in order not to place the military in a position of attempting to carry out a policy that would not be backed by the commander-in-chief who would be most responsible for seeing it through.

Mr. Obama, once inaugurated, initiated a “review” of Afghanistan policy, which actually consisted of nothing more than re-reviewing the intelligence and proposals presented the previous fall by Mr. Bush and General McKiernan. President Obama decided in March 2009 three things. First, to replace General McKiernan with General McChrystal, second to accept only a modest increase in troop levels in Afghanistan,rather than the full proposal presented, and finally to request a strategy update within a few months. General McChrystal presented a new strategy proposal in less time than President Obama had taken to make his initial decision. That new proposal lay on the President’s desk for four months before the President made a decision. During the interim, the proposal was attacked by the Ambassador to Afghanistan, was undermined by the Special Envoy to Afghanistan, and was opposed by the Vice President. When the President finally decided he did two things that undermined the play (beyond already having intolerably delayed any possible implementation). First, he conceded far less than had been requested in the nature of a surge both in numbers and pace of deployment. Second, he announced even as he was undertaking to enlarge the war effort that he would begin to terminate it not more than 18 months after that time (which meant not more than six months after full deployment had been achieved). It was observed at the time (that is, I observed) that the President had guaranteed that by July 2011 there would be no one left fighting in Afghanistan but U. S. forces eager to withdraw and Taliban/Al Qaeda forces eager to see them leave. Therefore, the President’s decision was destabilizing in the extreme. Coupled with the continuing diplomatic fiascoes that produced an unseemly quarrel with President Karzai, feckless interference by the Ambassador Eikenberry (a former general), and undermining by the Vice President, General McChrystal found himself in the impossible situation of attempting to carry-out a strategy that was not in fact effectively embraced by the commander-in-chief.

Moreover, it is important to observe that the U. S. Constitution subordinates the military to civilian control, but only in the form of the President and (for specific legal reasons) the Secretary of Defense and secretaries of the armed services. No one else bears that responsibility, not the Secretary of State, not the Ambassador, not the Special Envoy, and not even the Vice President. Accordingly, a military commander has no legal obligation to be subordinate to those civilian officers, though the commander-in-chief may well order him to work with and even accept direction from one or another of them. In this case, however, President Obama neither gave such direction nor protected his field commander from interference from these sources.

Accordingly, Gen. McChrystal did not violate the canons of the civilian-military chain of command. And it may reasonably be inferred that he took the extreme step he did only after despairing that no competent management from the commander-in-chief was ever to be expected. The President would continue to speak of “his” strategy only ambiguously, while rendering it next to impossible for the field commander either to accomplish it or to influence sharpening it (while serving as the foil behind which the President could affect to be acting upon military advice). The appointment of General Petraeus only highlights these perverse dynamics. President Obama avoided General Petraeus at the outset, simply to avoid looking like President Bush. Perhaps remembering his campaign allies attack upon General Petraeus as “General Betray Us”, he sought to keep a distance. In turning to Petraeus now, without acknowledging his own campaign attacks upon him and the strategy followed in Iraq, he acts in the familiar vein of seeking to attribute to others the practices and consequences for which he alone is responsible.